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TORT DEBTS VERSUS CONTRACT DEBTS:
LIABILITY OF THE COMMUNITY UNDER
CALIFORNIA'S NEW COMMUNITY
PROPERTY LAW
Should the liability of community property for the debts of the
spouses be different depending on whether the debt incurred is for tort
or contract? This was one of the most controversial questions debated
by the California Legislature in enacting Senate Bill 569, sponsored by
then Senator Mervyn Dymally,l which became effective as the law of
the state on January 1, 1975.2 The new legislation made fundamental
changes in California community property law,' perhaps the most sig-
nificant of which is the recasting of sections 5125 and 5127 of the Civil
Code to provide that either spouse, not just the husband, has the
management and control of community personal and real property.'
With the advent of what has been called "joint and several
management and contro ' 5 comes an increase in the liability of com-
1. Mervyn Dymally is now serving as Lieutenant Governor of the State of Cali-
fornia. Senate Bill 569 in its final form was cosponsored in the State Senate by Sena-
tors Dymally, Alfred H. Song, and Alan Robbins. Its coauthor in the Assembly was
Assemblyman Edwin L. Z'Berg.
2. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 987. A "trailer bill," Senate Bill 1601, was introduced
in 1974 and was cosponsored in the Senate by Senators Dymally and Song. It was ap-
proved by Governor Reagan on September 23, 1974, and appears in Cal. Stat. 1974, ch.
1206. Together these two bills constitute the "new law" as that phrase is used herein.
3. The new law amends sections 5102, 5105, 5110, 5113.5, 5116, 5120-23, 5125,
5127, and 5131-32 of the Civil Code. It repeals former sections 5101 ('The husband
is the head of the family. He may choose any reasonable place or mode of living.");
section 5117 (which set certain limits on the liability of the earnings and community
personal injury awards of the wife for the debts of the husband); 5124 (which gave the
wife exclusive management and control over her earnings and personal injury awards);
and 5130 (which under certain circumstances made the husband liable to third persons
who in good faith supplied necessaries to the wife). Added is new section 199, which
provides that "[t]he obligation of a father and mother to support their natural child . . .
shall extend only to, and may be satisfied only from, the earnings and separate property
of each, if there has been a dissolution of their marriage ....... The new law also
amends sections 12101 and 17300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
4. Neither spouse's management powers over community personal property are
unlimited, however. See text accompanying notes 90-95 infra. New section 5125 pro-
vides that "[a] spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest in a busi-
ness which is community personal property has the sole management and control of the
business or interest." For limits placed upon a spouse's management and control over
community real property, see CAL. CIv. CODE § 5127 (West Supp. 1975).
5. Bonanno, The Constitution and "Liberated" Community Property in Califor-
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munity property for the debts of the spouses. Under the old law the
entirety of community property could not, in most circumstances, be
charged with the contract debts of the wife,6 except those incurred for
necessaries; 7 the tort debts of either spouse "for death or injury to per-
son or property" could be satisfied only out of the tortfeasor-spouse's
separate property and that part of the community over which such
spouse exercised management and control.8 The new law, by contrast,
renders the entirety of community property liable for all torts and con-
tracts of either spouse incurred after marriage," expressly extending
community liability to contract debts incurred even before the January
1 effective date.'"
The Dymally legislation does not, however, treat the two kinds of
debts in precisely the same way. With regard to tort debts, it is now
necessary to ask whether the liability arose "while the married person
was performing an activity for the benefit of the community."" If so,
nia-Some Constitutional Issues and Problems Under the Newly Enacted Dymally Bill,
1 HAsT. CON. L.Q. 97, 98 (1974). This phrase should not be confused with what has
been called "joint control." See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
6. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340, as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5116
(West Supp. 1975).
7. The husband, and presumably the community property under the control of
the husband, were liable under certain circumstances to third persons who in good faith
supplied necessaries to the wife. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3343 (repealed 1975).
8. "(a) A married person is not liable for any injury or damage caused by the
other spouse except in cases where he would be liable therefor if the marriage did not
exist. (b) The liability of a married person for death or injury to person or property
may be satisfied only from the separate property of such married person and the com-
munity property of which he has the management and control." Cal. Stat. 1969, ch.
1608, § 8, at 3341, as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1975). See note
11 infra.
9. See notes 10-11 infra. Under the new law community property is also liable
for debts incurred by the spouses before marriage, or at least such liability would be
consistent with the principle that liability for debts should follow management and con-
trol. See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra. Presumably either spouse could claim
reimbursement if community funds were used to satisfy the antenuptial debts of the
other, just as under the old law the community could claim reimbursement if community
property was used by the husband to benefit his separate estate. See Weinberg v. Wein-
berg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). One important exception
to general community liabiblity under the new law appears in CAL. CIv. CODE § 199
(West Sapp. 1975). See note 3 supra.
10. "The property of the community is liable for the contracts of either spouse
which are made after marriage and prior to or on or after January 1, 1975." CAL. CiV.
CODE § 5116 (West Supp. 1975). For a discussion of the constitutional issues raised
by making this change retroactive, see Bonanno, The Constitution and "Liberated" Com-
munity Property in California-Some Constitutional Issues and Problems Under the
Newly Enacted Dymally Bill, 1 HAsT. CON. L.Q. 97 (1974).
11. "(a) A married person is not liable for any injury or damage caused by the
other spouse except in cases where he would be liable therefor if the marriage did not
exist. (b) The liability of a married person for death or injury to person or property
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community property is primarily liable. If not, the tortfeasor-spouse
must first exhaust his or her separate property before resorting to com-
munity funds.' 2 No analogous determination need be made as to con-
tract debts, however, as new section 5116 provides merely that "the
property of the community is liable for the contracts of either spouse
made after marriage. ... 1
This note will examine the development of this asymmetric result
and its practical implications, particularly for the "innocent" spouse in-
terested in protecting his or her share of community property against
debts incurred by the other, and for the creditor interested in levying
upon as much community property as possible. The conclusion
reached is that, for the first time in California, neither of these parties
need be greatly concerned whether the debt in question arose in tort
or in contract.
Tort Debts Versus Contract Debts: Historical Summary
At common law in California the entirety of community property
was liable for all debts incurred by either spouse before marriage-
including tort debts, contract debts, and obligations of all kinds."4
When a husband married his wife, it was said, he married her debts
as well.' 5
Postnuptial debts were a different story, however, and neither the
common law nor its subsequent statutory modifications ever equated
shall be satisfied as follows: (1) If the liability of the married person is based upon
an act or omission which occurred while the married person was performing an activity
for the benefit of the community, the liability shall first be satisfied from the community
property and second from the separate property of the married person. (2) If the lia-
bility of the married person is not based upon an act or omission which occurred while
the married person was performing an activity for the benefit of the community, the
liability shall first be satisfied from the separate property of the married person and sec-
ond from the community property." CAL. Civ. CoDa § 5122 (West Supp. 1975).
12. Id.
13. See note 10 supra. Traditional Spanish community property law, from which
the California system (with various modifications) is derived, also distinguished between
contracts and "delicts" in holding the community liable. There, however, it was only
with regard to contracts, not torts, that it was necessary to ask whether a "community
debt" had been incurred. If not, neither the wife's separate property nor her share of
the common property could be charged. With regard to torts, however, this question
was irrelevant; for under no circumstances could the innocent spouse's share of the com-
munity be taken to discharge the liability arising out of the other spouse's delict. W.
De. FUNIA & M. VAUGHAN, PRiNcIPLES OF CoMMuNrrY PROPERTY §§ 159, 181 (2d ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as DE FUNIAX]. For a discussion of the early history of the
community property system in California, see id. § 51.
14. See, e.g., Vlautin v. Bumpus, 35 Cal. 214 (1868); Van Maren v. Johnson, 15
Cal. 308 (1860).
15. Van Maren v. Johnson, 15 Cal. 308, 312 (1860).
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the ways in which such tort and contract debts might be chargeable
against community property. In the early 1870's, for example, various
sections of the Civil Code made it clear that community property was
not liable for the contracts of the wife. 16 On the other hand, the com-
mon law rule charging the community property (and the husband's
separate property) for the wife's torts was still in force.' Such tort
liability was said to rest upon, alternately, the merger of the wife's legal
personality into that of the husband,' 8 the control that the husband was
entitled to exercise over his wife,' 9 the frequent insufficiency of the
personal estate of the wife to satisfy tort judgments against her,2° and
the difficulty of determining whether she was acting at her own in-
stance or the instance of her husband.2'
It was not until 1913 that the legislature enacted statutory restric-
tions upon the common law rule. In that year Civil Code section 171 a
was added which read: "For civil injuries committed by a married
woman, damages may be recovered from her alone, and her husband
shall not be liable therefor . *.".., The new statute clearly exempted
the separate property of the husband from execution for his wife's torts,
but was ambiguous as to whether all or any part of the community prop-
erty was also exempt.
Part of the answer was provided twenty-two years later in Smed-
berg v. Bevilockway.23 In that case a California District Court of
Appeal held that a tort creditor of the wife could neither impress a lien
upon her share of community property, nor secure a compulsory parti-
tion to satisfy his judgment. 2  The court did not, however, pass upon
16. As originally enacted in 1872, section 167 of the Civil Code stated that "[a]
wife cannot make a contract for the payment of money." This section was rewritten
in 1873-74 to provide that "[t]he property of the community is not liable for the con-
tracts of the wife, made after marriage, unless secured by a pledge or mortgage thereof
executed by the husband."
17. Henley v. Wilson, 137 Cal. 273, 70 P. 21 (1902).
18. Id. at 274, 70 P. at 22.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 275, 70 P. at 21-22.
21. Id. at 274-75, 70 P. at 21. See also Zeliff v. Jennings, 61 Tex. 458, 471
(1884).
22. The husband would be liable, however, in cases where he would be jointly li-
able with the wife if the marriage did not exist. Cal. Stat. 1913, ch. 131, § 1, at 217.
For the subsequent history of § 171a, see text accompanying note 30 infra.
23. 7 Cal. App. 2d 578, 46 P.2d 820 (1935). See Comment, 9 S. CAL. L. REv.
270 (1936); Comment, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 218 (1936).
24. "However. . . the plaintiffs seek to hold the wife's interest in the community
property in liquidation of said judgment. Can it be so segregated and applied? At the
instance of the wife her interest could be segregated by a mutual contract between her
and her husband (Civ. Code, sec. 158); or in a divorce action (Civ. Code, sec. 146);
or a separate action based on a divorce action [citation omitted]; or, on her death, by
reason of the provisions of her will (Prob. Code, sec. 201). Our statutes provide no
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the liability of the whole of the community for the wife's torts. This
issue was decided twelve years later in McClain v. Tufts, 25 where
another California appellate court held that the community in toto
could not be charged for the wife's postnuptial torts. To hold other-
wise, the court stated, would be "an unwarranted interference with, and
infringement upon, the husband's right to management and con-
trol . .. "26
By 1947, then, community property was as immune from the tort
debts of the wife as it had been in 1874 from her contracts. By this
time, however, the rule as to the latter had been changed, i.e. in 1937
a sentence was added to Civil Code section 167 to provide that "the
earnings of the wife are liable for her contracts heretofore or hereafter
made before or after marriage. '2 7 The statutory addition did not, how-
ever, also specify that such earnings were available to satisfy tort judg-
ments against the wife. Curiously, therefore, by 1947 the result was
that at least a part of community property could be charged with the
wife's contracts (from which it had previously been entirely exempt),
while not even the wife's one-half share of community property was
liable for her torts (for which the community in its entirety had pre-
viously been chargeable).
This tort-contract asymmetry presented an interesting question of
strategy for a creditor of the wife whose claim sounded both in tort
and contract: could he waive the tort and sue on the contract, hoping
in this way to reach that part of community property consisting of the
wife's earnings? The court in Tinsley v. Bauer2 said that he could:
The fact that under section 171a, Civil Code, the community prop-
erty in general is not liable for the torts of the wife does not pre-
vent that the earnings of the wife may be liable under section 167,
certainly when the -tort has been waived and a contract action insti-
tuted .... 29
But the immunity of community property as to the wife's torts,
which had apparently been provided under old section 171a, came to
an end in 1968 when that section was substantially rewritten. The
now-renumbered section 5122 of the Civil Code stated in part that
(b) The liability of a married person for death or injury to
person or property may be satisfied only from the separate property
other methods." Smedberg v. Bevilookway, 7 Cal. App. 2d 57, 581, 46 P.2d 820, 821
(1935).
25. 83 Cal. App. 2d 140, 187 P.2d 818 (1948). See generally Comment, 21 S.
CAL. L. REV. 388 (1947).
26. 83 Cal. App. 2d at 142, 187 P.2d at 819.
27. Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 508, § 2, at 1497, as amended, CAL. Civ. CODE, § 5116
(West Supp. 1975).
28. Tinsley v. Bauer, 125 Cal. App. 2d 724, 271 P.2d 116 (1954).
29. Id. at 727-28, 271 P.2d at 118 (citation omitted).
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of such married person and the community property of which he
has the management and control.30
While this new section did not affect the liability of the community for
the husband's torts,"- it meant that for the first time since 1913 at least
a part of community property was clearly liable for the torts of the wife,
that part over which she exercised management and control. Nor was
this latter phrase an empty one, for in 1951 the wife had been given
exclusive management and control over her earnings and community
property personal injury damages.1
2
Even this change, however, did not mean that the community was
at last identically liable for the wife's contracts and the wife's torts. Re-
call, for example, that the 1937 amendment 3 had rendered the wife's
earnings liable for her contracts. But section 5122 now subjected both
her earnings and her personal injury damages to liability for her torts,
since she exercised management and control over both. Why such per-
sonal injury damages were not made available for her contracts as well
is not clear.
This, then, was the situation immediately prior to passage of the
Dymally bill in October 1973. If the new law treats the spouses' post-
nuptial tort and contract debts somewhat differently as far as the lia-
bility of the community is concerned, such differential treatment has
been present at least as far back as the early 1870's. At no time has
community property in California been held liable for the two kinds
of debts in precisely the same way. 4
Holding the Community Liable: Community Debts
Versus the Coextensiveness Principle
The different treatment accorded tort and contract debts under
the new law reflects, at least in part, the tension between two funda-
30. Subsection (a), which has been retained under the new law, provides that "[a]
married person is not liable for any injury or damage caused by the other spouse except
in cases where he would be liable therefor if the marriage did not exist." Cal. Stat.
1968, ch. 457, § 6, at 1079, as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5122 (West Supp. 1975).
31. The 1937 amendment had, for example, already exempted the wife's earnings
and community property personal injury awards, i.e. that part of community property
over which she was later given management and control, from the debts of the husband,
except for necessaries. Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 508, § 3, at 1497-98 (repealed 1975). For
a definition of "community property personal injury damages," see CAL. CIv. CODE §
4800 (West 1970).
32. Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1102, § 1, at 2860 (repealed 1975).
33. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
34. The two kinds of debts have, of course, been treated alike in some instances.
For example, as enacted in 1872, former section 168 of the Civil COde exempted the
wife's earnings from liability for her husband's debts, and r~o distinction was made be-
tween tort and contract debts in this regard,
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mentally different rationales for the imposition of liability on com-
munity property for the spouses' tort and contract debts: 35 The first
is the notion of community debts, i.e. that the common property should
be charged only with those debts a spouse incurs while acting for the
benefit of the community; the second is the coextensiveness principle,36
i.e. that that part of community property which a spouse manages and
controls should be liable for his debts, while being exempt from his
spouse's debts. These two principles are not irreconcilable in all cases,
of course.31 In certain situations, however, conflict between them is
unavoidable. For example, when a spouse who manages all or part
of community property incurs a separate debt, the two dictate opposite
conclusions as to whether community property should be held liable.
Further, the logic of the coextensiveness principle also requires that
community property be charged with all the manager-spouse's debts,
even those incurred before marriage, while such would in most cases
be "separate' under the notion of community debts. Thus the coex-
tensiveness principle is more favorable to creditors, at least in a situa-
tion like that established under the new law, where both spouses
manage and control all the community property. This note will next
examine the status of these principles and the conflict between them
in California law prior to the new legislation.
Community Debts
The basic concept of a "community debt" derives from Spanish
community property law, which as early as 1255 provided by statute
that debts incurred by either spouse (or the both of them) for the com-
mon benefit were payable from the common property.38 Those debts
were community debts, it was said, "which concerned the actual mar-
riage of man and wife and their partnership, and which were contracted
on its account . . . ."9 In Washington, a community property state
which has adopted the notion of community debts, the state supreme
court has stated the key criterion in this way: "The test of a community
35. See generally Pruzan, Community. Property and Tort Liability in Washington,
23 WASH. L. REv. 259 (1948).
36. This term is taken from the preamble to Senate Bill 1601, the "trailer bill,"
which provides, among other things, that "[tihe Legislature further finds and declares
that (1) the liability of community property for the debts of the spouses has been coex-
tensive with the right to manage and control community property and should remain
so. . . ." Cal. Stat. 1974, ch. 1206, § 1 (emphasis added).
37. The Washington court, for example, has on occasion treated the two princi-
ples almost interchangeably. See Pruzan, Community Property and Tort Liability in
Washington, 23 WASH. L. REV. 259, 260-61 (1948).
38. DE FuNiAX, supra note 13, § 159, at 378.
39. Guti~rrez, Quaestio CXX1X, No. 1, to Nov. Rec. Law 9, quoted in DE FuNiAK,
supra note 13, § 160, at 380.
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obligation is: 'Was the transaction carried on for the benefit of the
community?' "40 The positive aspect of this doctrine, then, holds the
spouses' common property accountable for those losses and expenses
incurred on behalf of the conjugal partnership.
There is a negative aspect as well: community property should
not be charged for those debts which a spouse incurs to benefit his
separate estate. This was a well-established rule under Spanish law."
Similarly, in New Mexico, another community property state which has
incorporated the notion of community debts, the legislature recently en-
acted a statute which provides in part that "[n]either spouse's interest
in community property or separate property shall be liable for the
separate debt of the other spouse."4
But should community property be entirely exempt from liability
for separate debts? Two views are prevalent. The first starts from
the premise that the "community" constitutes a separate juristic entity
in itself.4 3 As such, because it is more than merely the sum of its parts,
the community should not be chargeable to any extent for debts not
incurred for its benefit.
44
The second view proceeds from the premise that each spouse
owns one-half of the community property, just as each spouse owns his
or her separate property. It follows, then, that the entirety of com-
munity property should not be held for the separate debts of the other
spouse, for this would levy upon property "owned" by the other spouse
as well. But this ownership principle would appear to require that at
least the debtor-spouse's one-half share be available, as this would not
similarly infringe the other spouse's ownership rights. Such a scheme
exists in New Mexico, for example, where it is provided by statute that
the debtor's interest in the community is chargeable for his separate
debts, at least if his separate property is not sufficient. 5
Prior to the Dymally bill, however, California law explicitly re-
jected this concept of community debts in any form, the classic state-
40. Sun Life Assur. Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 544, 20 P.2d 1110, 1112 (1933)
(citations omitted).
41. DE FUNIAK, supra note 13, § 160, at 380.
42. N.M. STATS ANN. ch. 58-4A-4 (Supp. 1973).
43. See, e.g., In re Wallace, 22 F.2d 171 (E.D. Wash. 1927). But cf. Bortle v.
Osborne, 155 Wash. 585, 285 P. 425 (1930). In a more recent case the Washington
court stated that "[w]e have denied that a community was a separate and distinct juristic
entity, [citation omitted]; however, the exact nature of a community has been somewhat
less than crystal clear. . . . The community, like the Kingdom of Heaven, is 'like unto'
a number of things (see Matthew 13:24-33), but seems to defy precise definition."
Household Fin. Corp. v. Smith, 70 Wash. 2d 401, 403, 423 P.2d 621, 622 (1967).
44. See, e.g., Achilles v. Hoopes, 40 Wash. 2d 664, 245 P.2d 1005 (1952); Curtis
v. Hickenbottom, 158 Wash. 198, 290 P. 822 (1930).
45. N.M. STATS. ANN. ch. 57-4A-4 (Supp. 1973).
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ment in this regard being given by the court in Grolemund v. Cafferata:
"But in California there is no like concept of 'community debts,' though
occasionally the courts in this state refer to such, overlooking the fact
that the phrase is not appropriate to the California system. '4 6  This
statement notwithstanding, the notion of community debts was not en-
tirely absent from prior community property law in this state. First,
it is quite similar to the concept of "necessaries" (or "necessities of
life"), which was and still is recognized by statute.47  That is, debts
for food, clothing, shelter, medical expenses and so forth are by their
very nature almost always incurred for the benefit of the community.
As a result, debts for necessaries in California, like community debts
in other states, were chargeable against parts of community property
not otherwise available.4 8
Second, California courts have frequently used the concept and
even the terminology of community debts in settling rights between the
spouses at divorce, 49 and between the surviving spouse and creditor's
of a deceased spouse." For example, in Provost v. Provost, a divorce
action, the California court held that the community was entitled to re-
imbursement to the extent of community funds taken by the husband
for the improvement of his separate property. 51 Similarly, the court
in the more recent case of Weinberg v. Weinberg acknowledged the
traditional California view as set out in Grolemund, but added that
"[it does not follow, however, that the community can never claim
reimbursement from the husband's separate estate when community
property has been used to discharge a husband's [separate] obliga-
tion." 2  When the time for an accounting comes, then, California
courts have been willing to recognize categories which look very much
like "community" and "separate" debts. Unlike the true concept of
community debts, however, this principle has not been applied in Cali-
fornia to limit the power of creditors in levying upon community assets
to satisfy separate debts.
46. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 688, 111 P.2d 641, 645 (1941) (cita-
tion omitted).
47. Compare Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340 (repealed 1975), with CAL.
Civ. CODE 5121 (West Supp. 1975), amending Cal. Stat. 1969, cl. 1608, § 8, at 3341.
48. For example, under the old law the wife's earnings and personal injury awards
were liable for the husband's debts for necessaries, though being otherwise exempt from
his obligations. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340 (repealed 1975).
49. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal. 2d 107, 199 P.2d 671 (1948); Deacon
v. Deacon, 101 Cal. App. 195, 281 P. 533 (1929).
50. See, e.g., Johnston v. San Francisco Say. Union, 75 Cal. 134, 16 P. 753
(1888).
51. 102 Cal. App. 775, 283 P. 842 (1929).
52. 67 Cal. 2d 557, 563, 432 P.2d 709, 712, 63 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
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The Coextensiveness Principle
If California does not expressly accept the doctrine of community
debts, upon what theory has community property in this state been
charged with the debts of one or both spouses? The short answer is
that liability for debts has been designed to follow management and
control; therefore, that part of the community which a spouse manages
and controls should be liable for his debts. On this theory the court
in Grolemund allowed a tort creditor of the husband to reach com-
munity assets, stating that "to hold that the husband could not subject
the community property to liability for his tort would be to hold that
he could not manage and control the same."53
This coextensiveness principle has a negative aspect as well: that
part of community property which a spouse manages and controls
should be exempt from debts incurred by the nonmanaging spouse.
Accordingly, a California District Court of Appeal held in Grace v.
Carpenter"4 that community property could not be used to support the
wife's relatives without the husband's consent, stating that this result
followed from the fact that community property was under the hus-
band's management and control.55
Though until recently this principle did not exist in California by
statute,56 its presence under the old law was implicit in the way that
liability for debts did in fact follow management and control. For ex-
ample:
5 7
Management and Control Liability for Debts
1. Husband (H) has management 1. Community property is gen-
and control over community erally liable for H's contracts, 5
8
property. (5124, 5127) but generally exempt from W's
contracts. (5116)
2. Wife (W) has management and 2. W's earnings are liable for her
control over her earnings, contracts. (5116)
(5124)
3. W has management and control 3. W's earnings and tort injury
over her earnings and tort in- awards are not generally liable
jury awards. (5124) for H'sdebts. (5117)
4. Tort debts of either spouse may be satisfied only from the community
property over which that spouse has the management and control.
(5122)
53. Grolemund v. Cafferata, 17 Cal. 2d 679, 684, 111 P.2d 641, 644 (1941).
54. 42 Cal. App. 2d 301, 108 P.2d 701 (1941).
55. Id.
56. See note 36 supra.
57. Numbers in parentheses refer to sections of the California Civil Code, para-
phrased as they appeared immediately prior to passage of the new legislation.
58. No specific code section expressly rendered community property liable for the
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This correlation was not perfect, however. For example, the wife's
earnings were made liable for her contracts long before she was given
management and control thereof;59 and her community property
personal injury damages were never made liable for her contracts,
despite her management and control. Further, either spouse could
charge debts for necessaries against parts of community property which
that spouse did not manage and control.60
Community Debts and Coextensiveness Under the New Law
The new law resolves the conflict between these two principles
differently for contract and for tort debts, enacting two different ways
of protecting the ownership rights of each spouse in the community
property against liability for the separate debts of the other. As to con-
tract debts, now that both spouses manage and control all the com-
munity assets, both can make contracts chargeable against all the
community property. Such appears to be a straightforward application
of the coextensiveness principle. The new law neither limits such
liability to contracts made for the benefit of the community, nor in-
cludes any new sanctions which explicitly prevent one spouse from
charging the community with contract debts benefiting only his or her
separate estate.
One somewhat ambiguous "protection," however, has been
added: section 5125 now provides that "[e]ach spouse shall act in
good faith with respect to the other in the management and control of
the community property."' 61  Exactly what this new subsection means
is not clear, though its wording suggests that it at most provides an in-
terspousal remedy not directly affecting the rights of third-party
creditors. Whether it is mere surplusage or in fact affords the spouses
new ways of protecting their respective ownership interests remains to
be seen.
62
husband's contract debts. Such liability, however, was early established by case law.
See, e.g., Adams v. Knowles, 22 Cal. 283 (1865).
59. See text accompanying notes 27, 33 supra.
60. For example, the wife's earnings and personal injury awards were liable for
her husband's debts for necessaries. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3340, as amended,
CAL. CIV. CODF § 5117 (West Supp. 1975).
61. CAL. Cr. CoDE 5125 (West Supp. 1975).
62. See text accompanying notes 108-09 infra. A prior version of this section had
imposed more explicit limitations on a spouse's powers of management and control, at
least so far as management of a community property business was concerned: "On or
after January 1, 1975, a spouse may not (1) acquire or commence to operate or manage
a business or an interest in a business which would be community personal property or
(2) transfer community personal property to a business or an interest in a business
which the spouse is managing, without the written consent of the other spouse." That
this section created only an inter-spousal remedy was clear: "any spouse who is injured
by a violation of [the above 5ubsection] may bring an action to enjoin the violation
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When it comes to tort debts, on the other hand, the protection
given community property under the new law is more concrete. Sec-
tion 5122 is consistent with the coextensiveness principle in that it ul-
timately subjects the entirety of community property to liability for tort
debts, but it incorporates the concept of community debts as well.
That is, the tortfeasor-spouse must first exhaust his or her separate
property if at the time the liability arose the spouse was not performing
an activity "for the benefit of the community." 63 Community property
does become available, however, if such separate property is insuf-
ficient. In such situations the innocent spouse presumably can claim
reimbursement for whatever community funds are used to satisfy the
separate tort.
6 4
Community Liability for Tort Debts: Solutions in Other
States and in Prior Versions of the Dymally Bill
At the time California's new law was debated, three different
schemes existed in other community property states for holding com-
munity property liable for the spouses' postnuptial torts. Each re-
flected its own peculiar balance between community debts and coex-
tensiveness, and between these two and what will here be called the
"adequacy principle," which stresses the importance of providing an
adequate fund out of which legitimate tort claims can be satisfied.65
and may recover any diminution in the value of the community personal property caused
by the violation. The rights of any good faith purchaser or encumbrancer without
knowledge of the violation shall not be affected by the existence of the violation." S.B.
1601 (1974), as amended in Senate June 10, 1974.
A subsequent version broadened the protection given third persons: "The rights of
any purchaser, encumbrancer, or other person dealing with a spouse without knowledge
of a violation of this subdivision shall not be affected by the existence of the violation.
The purchaser, encumbrancer, or third person shall not have any duty of inquiry into
the existence of a written consent." S.B. 1601 (1974), as amended in Assembly Aug.
19, 1974. Two days later, however, this plan was discarded in favor of the simple "good
faith" provision. S.B. 1601 (1974), as amended in Assembly Aug. 21, 1974.
63. See text accompanying notes 79-89 infra.
64. If one or both spouses have liability insurance, another interesting question of
reimbursement is presented: if a spouse commits a separate tort and is indemnified un-
der an insurance policy paid for with community funds, is the community entitled to
reimbursement in an amount equal to the premiums paid? Section 5113 of the Civil
Code provides that "[tihis section [dealing wvth interspousal torts] does not affect the
right to indemnity provided by any insurance or other contract to discharge the tort-
feasor spouse's liability, whether or not the consideration given for such contract con-
sisted of community property," but does not address the question of reimbursement.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 5113 (West 1970).
65. For a discussion of the way in which the "community debts" principle can
conflict with the "adequacy principle," see Marsh, "California Family Law"-A Review,
42 CALIF. L. REv. 368, 378-81 (1954).
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Elements of each scheme can be discerned in the several versions the
Dymally Bill went through before reaching final form.
66
Washington: Liability for Community Torts Only
In Washington, community assets are not available in any amount
to satisfy judgments based on the "separate" torts of the spouses.
7
Such a provision appears to follow from the concept of community
debts, which has expressly been adopted in that state. At the same
time, however, Washington courts have placed community tort liability
on the theory of respondeat superior: the community can be charged
for the tortious acts of its agent, which until recently was usually the
husband because of his dominant powers of management and control 5
In apparent deference to the adequacy principle, respondeat superior
has also been liberally construed in the form of the "family car doc-
trine" to charge the community for torts committed by either spouse
while using the family automobile. 69
Texas: Liability for all Postnuptial Torts
At the opposite extreme is Texas, which charges the entirety of
community property for torts committed by either spouse after mar-
riage-whether or not the spouse was acting for the community's
benefit, 70 and whether or not the judgment includes punitive dam-
ages.71 Such broad community liability appears to indicate the domi-
nance of the adequacy principle. Aspects of the coextensiveness
principle have been incorporated as well: that part of the community
under the sole management of a spouse is liable for his antenuptial
torts, and that part under the joint control of both is liable for the an-
tenuptial torts of either.72
66. See generally Flood, Community Liability for the Tortious Acts of One of the
Spouses, 6 Aiuz. L. REv. 268 (1965); Lay, Tort Liability of Community Property, 13
WAYNE L. REv. 706 (1967); Pruzan, Community Property and Tort Liability in Wash-
ington, 23 WASI-. L. Rv. 259 (1948); Note, Community Property-Liability for Torts
of Spouses, 27 NEB. L. REv. 56 (1948).
67. See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Sellner, 58 Wash. 2d 101, 361 P.2d 165 (1961).
68. See, e.g., Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 626, 60 P.2d 669, 701 (1936).
69. For example, the Washington court in one case found "community benefit"
in the actions of the husband in driving the family auto to a dance (though his wife
was not present), reasoning that recreation is beneficial to the welfare of the community.
King v. Williams, 188 Wash. 350, 62 P.2d 710 (1936). For a discussion of the "family
car doctrine" in California community property law prior to the new legislation, see de
Funiak, Personal Injuries Under California Community. Property Law, 3 CAL. WEST. L.
REv. 69, 71-73 (1967).
70. See Lay, Tort Liability of Community Property, 13 WAYNE L. REv. 706, 718
(1967).
71. See Patterson & Wallace v. Frazer, 100 Tex. 103, 94 S.W. 324 (1906).
72. TEx. FAMILY CoDE § 5.61 (1969).
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New Mexico: One-half the Community is Liable for Separate Torts
In McDonald v. Senn,73 a New Mexico decision antedating recent
statutory changes in that state, the supreme court held that the wife's
one-half share of community property should be deemed vested, and
as such was available ,to satisfy a tort judgment against her.74  Unlike
the courts in California,75 the court here found no inconsistency be-
tween -this result and the then-existing powers of the husband as exclu-
sive manager of the community.
With new legislation giving both spouses mangement and con-
trol,76 it is also provided that though community property is liable for
community torts, neither spouse's one-half share can be charged for the
separate -torts of the other.
77
In Washington, then, we see clear emphasis on the community
debts principle which exempts all community property from liability for
separate torts; in Texas we observe the dominance of the adequacy
principle in that no restriotions whatsoever are placed on -the commu-
nity's liability for postnuptial torts; and in New Mexico we note the em-
phasis placed on the ownership principle that each spouse has a vested
interest in one-half the community property. Recall that California,
immediately prior to the new law, had applied the coextensiveness prin-




The California Legislature adopted none of these schemes in its
entirety in enacting new section 5122. Instead, the result is the rather
unique strategy of community tort liability described above.7 9 Before
reaching its final form, however, section 5122 went through a rather
complicated legislative metamorphosis, each stage of which afforded
the innocent spouse a different way of proteoting his or her share of
community property against liability for the other spouse's torts. In
73. McDonald v. Senn, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949).
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
76. N.M. STATS ANN. ch. 57-4A-8 (Supp. 1973).
77. Id. ch. 57-4A-4.
78. See text accompanying note 8 supra. Oklahoma once had a somewhat simi-
lar scheme: "The separate property of the wife and that portion of community property,
record title to which is in her name or which is under the management, control and
disposition of the wife, shall be subject to debts contracted by the wife arising out of
tort, or otherwise, but not to debts or liabilities of the husband. [And similarly for the
husband and his debts]." Okla. Laws 1939, § 7 (repealed 1945).
79. See note 11 supra.
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addition, certain stages were clearly more favorable to creditors than
others.
SENATE BILL 45 (as amended on February 28, 1972): provided that the
tort liability of a married person should be satisfied first out of such person's
separate property; then out of his earnings; and only then out of the other
community property.0
This method sought to protect the innocent spouse by requiring
the tortfeasor to use up assets which were peculiarly his (or -hers) be-
fore turning to general community funds.81 Unlike the old law, how-
ever, it placed no limit on the amount of community property which
might ultimately become available to tort creditors.
SENATE BILL 569 (as amended on June 11, 1973): provided that
a spouse's tort debts were to be satisfied first out of such spouse's separate
property, then out of community property.82
This version set up a priority arrangement identical to that
above, except that no distinction was drawn 'between a spouse's earn-
ings and the rest of the community property. As above, all the com-
mon property might under certain circumstances be subject to execu-
tion.
SENATE BILL 569 (as amended on June 11, 1973): provided that
a spouse's tort debts were to be satisfied first out of such spouse's separate
property, then out of the community property over which the spouse had
management and control.8
3
This stage incorporated yet another priority arrangement, one
which ostensibly limited community liability to that part which the tort-
feasor-spouse managed and controlled. This "limitation' seems some-
what curious, however, in light of the fact that this version also gave
either spouse, with certain exceptions, management and control over
all the community property.
4
SENATE BILL 569 (as amended on June 18, 1973): provided that
a spouse's tort debts be satisfied first out of such spouse's separate property,
then out of community property.8 5
Were this new priority plan the only change, this particular revi-
sion would hardly have been notable. But two other changes were in-
troduced as well. First, it was provided that the liability of the com-
munity could not exceed one-half the value of community property at
the time judgment was entered. This, of course, would have been a
80. S.B. 45 (1972), as amended in Senate Feb. 28, 1972.
81. Under the old law a similar priority scheme existed as to interspousal torts.
CAL. Crv. CODE 5113 (West 1970). This section was not changed by the new legisla-
tion.
82. S.B. 569 (1973), as amended in Senate May 23, 1973.
83. S.B. 569 (1973), as amended in Senate June 11, 1973.
84. Id.
85. S.B. 569 (1973), as amended in Senate June 18, 1973.
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major setback for tort creditors, since under no circumstances would
they have been allowed to reach the entirety of community property.
Second, if even this one-half were taken in any amount, an equal
amount was to be set aside to become the separate property of the inno-
cent spouse. s6 In short, this was simply a statutory requirement that
reimbursement take place.
SENATE BILL 569 (as amended on September 10. 1973): provided that
a spouse's tort liability should be satisfied first out of such spouse's separate
property, then community property-unless the liability arose out of an
activity which was performed for the benefit of the community, in which case
the priority was to be reversed. This version also limited community liability
to one-half the value of community property at the time of judgment and
continued the set-aside procedure for adding to the innocent spouse's separate
property.87
This was the last revision before section 5122 was rewritten in its
present form. 8 In it the terminology of community debts appears for
the first time, but in somewhat confused fashion. That is, even when
the tortfeasor had been acting "for the benefit of the community," no
more than half the community property could be reached; and even
when tort liability had been incurred on the community's behalf, any
resort to community funds would be matched by a set-aside to the "in-
nocent" spouse. Such spouse would therefore have been protected to
the point of overkill, at the expense of both -the tortfeasor-spouse and
community tort creditors.
Thus, by -the time that this section was amended for the last time
in conference on September 14, 1973, three different strategies for
protecting the ownership interest of the innocent spouse had been pro-
posed: a priority scheme requiring an initial resort to separate prop-
erty, a formal set-aside procedure, and a fixed limit on the percentage
of community property available to satisfy a spouse's tort liability. Of
these three, only the priority notion was incorporated in the bill as en-
acted-with priority as between separate ,and community property be-
ing made to turn on whether the tortfeasor had been acting for the ben-
efit of the community at the time liability was incurred.89 New section
5122, unlike its predecessor, makes all -the community property avail-
able to tort creditors if the tortfeasor's separate property is not suffi-
cient. Nor is reimbursement made mandatory, though it is of course
still possible. The result is that section 5122 provides comparatively
little protection for -the innocent spouse's share of community property.
On the other hand, when the debt is for contract, not tort, not even
86. Id.
87. S.B. 569 (1973), as amended in Assembly Sept. 10, 1973.
88. See note 11 supra.
89. See note 11 supra.
1590 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
May 1975] SPOUSES' DEBTS
this modified concept of community debts has been incorporated to
limit community liability.
Community Liability for Contract Debts:
Limitations Under Prior Versions of the Dymally Bill
Though the Dymally law equalizes the rights of -the spouses in the
management and control of community property, such rights are not
without limits. For example, the following restrictions -are expressly
set out under the new law: (1) A spouse may not make a gift of
community personal property or dispose of community personal prop-
erty without a valuable consideration." (2) A spouse may not sell,
convey, or encumber the furniture, furnishings, or fittings of the home,
or the clothing or wearing apparel of the other spouse or minor chil-
dren, without the written consent of the other spouse. 1  (3) In gen-
eral, both spouses must join in executing any instrument by which com-
munity real property or any interest therein is leased for a longer period
than one year, or is sold, conveyed, or encumbered. 92 Under the old
law the first two restrictions similarly limited the husband in his man-
agement of community property generally, 93 and a restriction similar
to the first precluded the wife from giving away that part of the com-
munity which she managed and controlled."4 The third restriction was
carried over from the old law without substantial change.95 Each may
be seen as, among other things, a way of protecting the ownership
rights of one spouse against the detrimental management actions of the
other.
During the debate over the new law, three additional protections
were at one time or another written in. Each would have constituted
a significant limitation on the ability of the spouses -to make contracts
chargeable against community property. Two involved opting for a dif-
ferent system of management and control, while the third established
a strict trusteeship relationship between the spouses.
The first was included in an early version of Senate Bill 45, -the
predecessor of Senate Bill 569. The management and control section
there provided that "[t]he community property is subject to the joint
management, control, and disposition of the husband and wife, unless
the spouses provide otherwise by power of attorney or other agreement
90. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1975).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 5127.
93. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1609, § 24, at 3358, as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125
(West Supp. 1975).
94. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1608, § 8, at 3341 (repealed 1975).
95. Compare Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1609, § 25, at 3358, with CAL,. Civ. CODE § 5127
(West Supp. 1975).
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in writing." Such a system of joint control had been frequently dis-
cussed, though rarely approved, by the commentators.96 It should be
noted that this was not the same as equal control, wherein each spouse
would have power to dispose of community assets without the consent
of the other. Instead, joint control requires both spouses to join in the
acquisition or disposition of all community property in the same way
that the consent of each was required to encumber or convey commu-
nity real property under the old law.
97
Such a scheme would have provided each spouse strong protection
against irresponsible contracts made by the other. On the other hand,
a system of unqualified joint control -threatened to generate consider-
able inconvenience for the spouses and slow the pace of commercial
transactions. By the time this bill had been amended on April 10,
1972, the section providing for joint control had been deleted.
A second system of management and control was proposed in Sen-
ate Bill 569, as amended on June 11, 1973. After stating that either
spouse was to have management and control of community personal
property, this version further provided that neither spouse could do any
of the following without the written consent of the other: (1) Pur-
chase personal property the value of which exceeds one thousand dol-
lars with community personal property; (2) transfer or otherwise dis-
pose of community personal property the value of which exceeds one
thousand dollars; (3) encumber the community personal property by
a debt or obligation -the amount of which exceeds one thousand dol-
lars; and (4) incur a debt of obligation the amount of which exceeds
one thousand dollars for which the community personal property is li-
able.98 This system of hybrid joint-equal control, equal below $1000,
joint above $1000, had been recommended by at least two commenta-
tors as a means of accomodating the interests of the spouses in prevent-
ing dissipation with the needs of the commercial world for untram-
meled business -transactions.99 Of course, this plan would not have
prevented a spouse bent on dissipating community assets from doing
so by incurring a large number of contract debts so long as each was
96. See, e.g., Bingaman, The Effects of An Equal Rights Amendment on the New
Mexico System of Community Property: Problems of Characterization, Management,
and Control, 3 N.M.L. REV. 11, 39-55 (1973); Note, Management and Control of Com-
munity Property: Sex Discrimination in California, 6 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 383, 400-03
(1973); Note, Community Property: Male Management and Women's Rights, 1972
LAw & Soc. ORDER 163, 171-75.
97. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1609, § 25, at 3358, as amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5127
(West Supp. 1975).
98. S.B. 569 (1973), as amended in Senate June 11, 1973.
99. Note, Equal Rights and Equal Protection: Who Has Management and Con-
trol?, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 892, 919-20 (1973); Note, Community Property: Male Man-
agement and Women's Rights, 1972 LAw & Soc. ORDER 163, 173.
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below the $1000 limit. This scheme was discarded a few versions later
when Senate Bill 569 was again amended on August 15, 1973.
As originally introduced, the Dymally Bill would ,also have given
the spouses a third way of protecting their respective ownership inter-
ests in community property, as that version's section 5125 provided in
part:
(c) In dealing with the community property, whether pur-
suant to an agreement between husband and wife or without agree-
ment, each spouse acts as a trustee for the other and is subject to the
rule governing fiduciary relationships . . . . If a spouse violates
his or her fiduciary obligation under this section the other spouse
may petition the superior court for an accounting or other equit-
able relief, if informal methods of adjustment, including arbitra-
tion, are unavailable or have proved unsuccessful. The court may
make any order necessary to protect the rights of both spouses.100
So stated, this section did two important things: it crystallized the na-
ture of the duty each spouse owed the other and expressly included
an action for an accounting, presumably including a nondissolution ac-
counting, among the remedies available to an aggrieved spouse.
Neither was unambiguously established in the case law antedating this
legislation. 10' For example, though a number of cases had character-
ized the duty a husband owed his wife in managing community assets
as being in the nature of a fiduciary or trustee,10 2 at least one recent
case held that he was not required to be as prudent as a trustee, or
to keep detailed records of income to and payments from community
property.'0 3 Nor was the husband, like a true fiduciary, to be held per-
sonally liable for losses stemming from an improvident investment of
the managed assets.'04 On the other hand, -there is dicta in Somps v.
Somps, 05 decided only a few years earlier, that the husband "has the
duty of accounting for disbursements and keeping records if he intends
charging the community with the obligation."'
Though this particular section would have eliminated the uncer-
tainty in this regard, it is questionable whether as a practical matter
100. S.B. 569 (1973).
101. For a discussion of the wife's remedies under the old law, see Grant, How
Much of a Partnership is Marriage?, 23 HAsrGs LJ. 249 (1971), and Note, The Equal
Rights Amendment and Inequality Between Spouses Under the California Community
Property System, 6 LoYoLA L. Rlv. (Los ANGELES) 66, 84-86 (1973). For a discussion
of how the new law affects spousal remedies for mismanagement, see Note, Califor-
nia's New Community Property Law-Its Effect on Interspousal Mismanagement Litiga-
tion, 5 PAc. L.J. 723 (1974).
102. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, 260 Cal. App. 2d 583, 67 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1968).
103. Williams v. Williams, 14 Cal. App. 3d 560, 567, 92 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389
(1971).
104. See id. at 566-67, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
105. 250 Cal. App. 2d 328, 58 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1967).
106. Id. at 340, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
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imposing a strict trustee relationship between the spouses would have
been feasible, given the special nature of the marriage relationship.
At various points in its legislative history, then, the Dymally bill
included three rather elaborate proposals for limiting community liabil-
ity for contract debts incurred by the spouses. Two of these-those
which focused on different systems of management and control-would
have imposed such limitation by expressly ,limiting the ability of each
spouse to make contracts binding upon the community in the first place.
The third would have provided each spouse with an after-the-fact rem-
edy which presumably would not have affected the rights of third-party
creditors. In the end each was rejected in favor of a simple "good
faith" provision. 1 7 As was the case with regard to restricting the com-
munity's liability for tort debts, that alternative which afforded the least
explicit protection of each spouse's ownership rights had become law.
Tort Debts Versus Contract Debts:
The Practical Impact of the New Law
On its face, the new community property law does not treat tort
debts and contract debts in the same way. In particular, it is only with
regard to tort debts that the new law expressly incorporates a modified
concept of community debts to limit community liability.
This apparently asymmetric result is consistent with a broad his-
torical pattern in California of holding the community differentially li-
able for the two kinds of debts. In the early years the community was
liable for the wife's postnuptial torts, but not her contracts. Then, as
community property became increasingly liable for her contracts, it be-
gan -to be protected against her torts. The near-immunity of commu-
nity property in this regard came to an end in 1968, but the wife's tort
debts were still not chargeable against the community to the same extent
as were her contracts.
Much of the controversy surrounding the Dymally Bill stemmed
from the conflict between two fundamentally different theories for im-
posing liability on community property for debts: the so-called coex-
tensiveness principle and the concept of community debts. In short,
the problem facing the legislature was how to equalize the management
powers of the spouses over the entirety of community property while
protecting the ownership rights of each in one-half. This conflict is
epitomized by the situation in which a managing spouse incurs a sep-
arate debt.
This conflict was resolved in a different way for tort and contract
debts, and different schemes were enacted to limit community liability
107. See text accompanying notes 90-107 supra.
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for each. For tort debts incurred while a spouse is acting "for the ben-
efit of the community," community property is primarily liable. Other-
wise, the tortfeasor-spouse must first exhaust his or her separate prop-
erty. As to contract debts, each spouse is now under a statutory duty
to act in "good faith" toward the other in the management of commu-
nity property. What are the practical consequences, if any, of this dif-
ference in approach?
Impact on the Innocent Spouse
The scope of the protection afforded the nondebtor spouse under
the new law hinges upon two key questions of statutory interpretation.
First, as to tort debts, when is a spouse acting "for the benefit of the
community"? In Washington, where only community debts can be
charged against community property, -this phrase has been interpreted
quite broadly in order to provide an adequate fund for the injured
plaintiff.108 In California, this would not be required since the entirety
of community property is ultimately available to satisfy separate as well
as community tort debts. Thus a narrower interpretation of this phrase
could be adopted 'to protect the ownership interest of the innocent
spouse without jeopardizing the rights of tort creditors.
Second, as to contract debts, what is the nature of the good faith
duty now imposed on both spouses by section 5125? On the one hand,
the choice of a "good faith" rather than a "prudent man" standard
would seem to indicate an intention to create something less than the
strict fiduciary relationship sometimes mentioned in the cases. On
the other, the fact that the legislature saw fit for the first time to include
a section like this at all should be taken as clear evidence of its concern
with the problem of dissipation. That even stronger measures were
considered underlines this concern; that they were rejected may mean
only that the legislature concluded that imposing a more technical sys-
tem of accountability upon the spouses would not be feasible. The
good faith clause simply allows California courts to exercise wide dis-
cretion in adjusting rights as between the spouses by fashioning what-
ever remedy is appropriate, presumably including such equitable rem-
edies as injunctions and a nondissolution accounting.
In the end, however, the protection afforded one spouse against
debts incurred by the other is not likely to differ significantly as a result
of the tort or contract nature of the debts. With regard to either kind
of debt the community is now liable in its entirety. With regard to
both kinds of debts, -the innocent spouse can make a claim for reim-
bursement if the other spouse takes community property to satisfy a
separate debt. The only difference is that the modified concept of
108. See note 69 supra.
May 19751 SPOUSES' DEBTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
community debts, which requires an initial resort to separate property
to satisfy separate debts, is explicitly spelled out in section 5122,
whereas it receives only implicit recognition in the good faith clause
of section 5125. The most this is likely to mean in practice is that
there may be a difference in the time when the claim for reim-
bursement can be made. That is, with regard to contract debts the
innocent spouse has no statutory authority to defeat a creditor's levy
upon nonexempt community property. A claim for reimbursement
must be asserted in a separate action following execution. With regard
to tort debts, on the other hand, such spouse might be able to defeat
a levy on particular community property by citing the mandatory pri-
ority scheme in section 5122 and demonstrating that the separate prop-
erty of the debtor-spouse is sufficient. Conceivably, the required proof
could be made in a procedure similar to that set out in section 689 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a way in which third per-
sons claiming an interest in property which has been levied upon can
assert their claims. If successful, this strategy would of course make
reimbursement unnecessary since no community property would be
taken in the first place. However, whether California courts will be
willing to construe section 5122 so as to make this potential difference
a real one remains to be seen.
Impact on Creditors
There is perhaps even less reason for the creditor of a married
person to be concerned whether his claim is for tort or contract. In
either case, he is now able to reach and levy against all the community
property. And, even if his levy on particular community property is
attacked by an innocent spouse using the procedure described above,
such attack can succeed only upon a showing that sufficient separate
property exists to satisfy the creditor's claim.
If the tort-contract distinction is no longer of great significance,
what is the broader impact of the new law on creditors? In theory,
the result would seem to be a substantial increase in community liabil-
ity, Senator Dymally once characterizing his bill as a "creditor's bill of
rights."1" 9 It is true, for example, that for the first time in California
the entirety of community property can now be charged with all the
postnuptial debts of either spouse. As to tort debts, this increase is
a real one, as community tort liability under the old law was limited
to that part of community property which the tortfeasor-spouse managed
and controlled. 1 '
109. Interview with Ms. Marl Goldman, former member of Senator Dymally's staff,
Oct. 7, 1974, in Sacramento, Cal. Ms. Goldman is now serving as Chief Counsel to
the Joint Committee on Legal Equality, Sacramento, Cal.
110. See note 11 supra.
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The increase in liability for contract debts, however, may not be
as important as it seems at first glance. For example, even what would
appear to be the most notable expansion in this regard-the fact that
community property is now liable for the contracts of the wife-does
not in practice make the wife's creditors much better off than they were
under the old law. Before, if the wife incurred a small debt, commu-
nity assets could ordinarily be reached on the theory of necessaries. If
a more substantial purchase was involved, creditors invariably required
the husband to sign as well.11 If for some reason 'the husband's signa-
ture was not obtained, a creditor could still hope to recover against
community property on the 'theory that the wife was acting as the hus-
band's agent."' Only rarely, then, did creditors lose very much be-
cause the old law did not expressly charge the entirety of community
property with the wife's contracts.
Does the new law at least mean that creditors can now feel safe
in contracting with the wife without bothering to obtain the husband's
signature as well? Probably so, but even here some ambiguity remains.
That is, though sections 5125 and 5127 specify that 'both spouses are
to have the management and control of community property, -there are
at least two exceptions to this -rule. First, section 5125 also provides
that "[a] spouse who is operating or managing a business or an interest
in a business which is community personal property has the sole man-
agement and control of the -business or interest.""' 3  Second, the
spouses might attempt to change the statutory pattern of shared man-
agement and control by express agreement between themselves, for ex-
ample, to reinvest the husband with sole power in this regard. In ei-
ther case the coextensiveness principle that liability for debts should
follow management and control could conceivably be interposed in an
effort to avoid liability for debts incurred by the managing spouse. Such
a result would undoubtedly be contrary to legislative intent, but litiga-
tion of these and related problems will probably have to take place be-
fore community creditors adopt a "one signature' policy as a general
rule.
Robert J. Stumpf*
111. The inability of married women in California to obtain credit in their own
names was frequently cited in a series of hearings held by a joint interim committee
of the California Legislature as a major problem stemming from the management and
control provisions of the old law. See CAmFoIA. LEGisrkuRE JonT INTERI m COM-
m=rTrE ON JuDicIARY, HEARINGS ON COMMUNriy PROPERTY, TRANSCRIPT No. 270, at 69,
98-99, 107-08, 116-20, 123-31 (Sept.-Oct. 1972).
112. See, e.g., Hulsman v. Ireland, 205 Cal. 345, 270 P. 948 (1928).
113. CAL. CV. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1975).
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